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Berger (Forthcoming) argues that morally intimate rather than relational surrogates (per 
se) hold the moral authority to apply the best interests standard as surrogate decision-makers. We 
agree that a kind of intimacy rather than any kind of relation is the appropriate criterion by which 
to evaluate applications of the best interests standard. But, we argue that it is ultimately epistemic 
intimacy that distinguishes morally appropriate from morally dubious applications of the best 
interests standard in cases of surrogate decision-making.  
We have argued elsewhere that whether surrogates can meet an obligation to act on a 
patient’s best interests depends first and foremost on whether they can surmount their epistemic 
burdens with respect to this goal (Crutchfield and Scheall, 2019). A person’s epistemic burden 
with respect to some goal is simply everything that the person does not know, which they must 
know, in order to realize the goal deliberately, i.e., without recourse to the assistance of luck, 
fortune, or any other spontaneous forces (Scheall, 2019). A surrogate decision-maker’s epistemic 
burden with respect to the goal of applying the best interests standard in a morally appropriate 
manner in some particular case is thus the knowledge required to deliberately realize this goal 
that the surrogate lacks in decision-relevant circumstances. Typically, a surrogate’s epistemic 
burden consists of some combination of ignorance concerning the incapacitated patient’s best 
interests or ignorance of treatment options in keeping with these interests. Put another way, a 
surrogate might be ignorant of either ends associated with morally appropriate applications of the 
best interests standard or of means adequate to deliberately realize these ends.  




We have also argued that epistemic burdens play an essential role in all human decision-
making. The epistemic burdens of competing courses of action determine what counts as an 
option and where options are ranked in a person’s initial incentive structure or preference 
ranking. Courses of action that bear impossibly heavy epistemic burdens rarely, if ever, figure as 
options in a person’s incentive structure. More generally, the heavier the epistemic burden of an 
option relative to other options, the lower it tends to appear in a person’s preference ranking 
(Scheall and Crutchfield, Manuscript). A decision-maker’s options are, in effect, pre-consciously 
filtered and ranked according to their comparative epistemic burdens in the given decision 
context. Epistemic burdens are thus unique – and, we argue, logically prior – among 
considerations that figure in human decision-making.  
It is the pre-conscious filtering and ranking of courses of action according to their 
comparative epistemic burdens that makes cases of surrogate decision-making far more complex 
than cases of individual decision-making, in which a person decides for herself. In single-person 
cases, the menu of options from the person chooses has been filtered and ranked for the relative 
epistemic burdens of relevant courses of action. In surrogate cases, however, there is no 
guarantee that the menu of options from which the surrogate chooses mirrors the menu of 
options from which the incapacitated patient would choose, if she were able to decide for herself. 
Nothing ensures that a surrogate knows of or knows how to realize the options in the patients’ 
best interests. In short, epistemic burdens can prevent (even the most morally inclined) 
surrogates from meeting their obligation to act on patients’ best interests.  
Berger’s morally intimate surrogate has, among other things, overcome her epistemic 
burdens with respect to the goal of applying the best interests standard in a particular case. In 
other words, a morally intimate surrogate is epistemically intimate with the patient and exhibits 
other features, which Berger names as having a shared personal history, demonstrating 




trustworthiness in action, and exhibiting enduring concern. Thus, where a particular patient-
surrogate relationship fails to be morally intimate, either epistemic intimacy or at least one of 
these latter relational properties is lacking. We argue below, however, that epistemic intimacy is 
more fundamental than these relational considerations (in isolation or collectively). Indeed, the 
ultimate significance of these other relational properties may be merely that they tend to 
engender epistemic intimacy. Sharing a personal history with, demonstrating trustworthiness to, 
and exhibiting enduring concern for a patient may be only means to the end of overcoming one’s 
epistemic burdens with regard to the patient’s best interests.  
Berger also explains the moral authority of applying the best interests standard by 
appealing to moral intimacy: a person has moral authority to apply the standard because they are 
morally intimate with the incapacitated patient. We argue that the notions of epistemic intimacy 
and epistemic burdens not only help to explain the notion of moral intimacy, but also better 
explain the moral authority to apply the best interests standard. Bioethicists and physicians 
should consider a surrogate’s epistemic standing relative to the patient’s best interests before 
pronouncing on the former’s ethical probity. 
 
Who is typically epistemically intimate? 
 
 Life partners are often the most epistemically intimate of potential surrogates. 
Unacquainted individuals have no epistemic intimacy. All other surrogates, including physicians, 
are somewhere in between. In fact, physicians are often significantly epistemically intimate with 
patients, even with patients they have never met. This is because physicians have at least 
overcome the heavy epistemic burdens associated with knowledge of medical treatments 
appropriate to realize a given end, even if they may not know the ends associated with a 




particular patient’s best interests. As Berger mentions, distant family members tend to have little 
epistemic intimacy, usually less than that of a physician, if only for the latter’s more extensive 
medical knowledge. For the same reason, court-appointed public guardians tend to have very 
little epistemic intimacy with incapacitated patients. 
 
Epistemic intimacy and moral intimacy 
 
 When a surrogate fails to meet the condition of moral intimacy with respect to an 
incapacitated patient, it is either because they are not epistemically intimate with or fail to bear 
one or more of the aforementioned relational properties to the patient. However, a surrogate can 
make decisions in keeping with the best interests standard even where the relational requirements 
of moral intimacy fail to obtain, provided that the surrogate is epistemically intimate with the 
incapacitated patient. Consider, for example, a surrogate who professes to not have any enduring 
concern for the patient, but who is highly epistemically intimate with them, such as a former 
spouse with whom the incapacitated patient had an acrimonious divorce due to mutual 
infidelities. Or consider a toy example: a patient incapacitated upon being struck by a vehicle 
after exiting a cab shared with a stranger with whom the soon-to-be-incapacitated person had an 
intimate conversation about her personal values. Such surrogates are likely to be relatively well 
positioned with respect to the patient’s best interests. But, notice that the converse is not true: 
even if all of the relational conditions obtain between a surrogate and a patient, the surrogate 
cannot speak to the patient’s best interests, if she is not epistemically intimate with the patient. 
Moral intimacy might help in applying the best-interests standard, but it is epistemic intimacy 
that does the heavy lifting.  
 




Epistemic intimacy and best interests standard 
 
 Berger claims that the moral authority to apply the best interests standard is because of 
the surrogate’s moral intimacy. A better explanation is that the surrogate is epistemically 
intimate with the patient.  
 There are several common criteria for evaluating explanations, such as predictive and 
explanatory power, coherence, and simplicity. Epistemic intimacy is a better explanation because 
it explains at least as much as moral intimacy and is much simpler. Moral intimacy is just 
epistemic intimacy plus other things, and therefore requires more conceptual machinery to 
explain why a person is in a position to apply the best interests standard. 
 Overcoming the epistemic burdens associated with knowing a person’s interests and how 
to realize ends associated with them places a surrogate in a position of moral authority to make 
decisions on behalf of that person according to the best interests standard (and, not to mention, 
according to the substituted judgment standard). When a physician or nurse is evaluating whether 
a person is a suitable surrogate, often the focus is on their relation to the patient. But, apart from 
the fact that close relations tend to engender epistemic intimacy, the relation itself is irrelevant. 
What is most important is that the potential surrogate has overcome relevant epistemic burdens, 
that she is epistemically intimate with the patient’s best interests. For marginally represented or 
unrepresented patients, the most epistemically intimate surrogate is often the attending physician. 
Distant relatives or court-appointed public guardians are less epistemically intimate and so in a 
worse position to make appropriate judgments according to the best interests standard. Involving 
multiple stakeholders, such as members of an ethics committee, in a decision may be no better 
(though more costly) than relying on the attending physician alone, because such measures only 
distribute remaining epistemic burdens over a group of people equally ignorant of the patient’s 




interests and less knowledgeable of how to achieve medical goals. The notions of epistemic 
burdens and epistemic intimacy can therefore contribute to mitigating the problems associated 
with marginally represented or unrepresented patients in a way that moral intimacy cannot. 
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